This post illustrates a much more direct attempt at ransomware recovery targeting MSSQL databases, where we uncovered and further exploited bugs present in the LockBit 2.0 ransomware code, up to the point where we were able to revert the encryption process for these database files and restore them back to a functioning state. This is often an impossible task to carry out, given that it implies breaking decades of practical research into cryptography– not simply in theory, but in actual implementation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn organizations that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have gained network access through exploitation of default MFA protocols and a known vulnerability. As early as May 2021, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors took advantage of a misconfigured account set to default MFA protocols at a non-governmental organization (NGO), allowing them to enroll a new device for MFA and access the victim network. The actors then exploited a critical Windows Print Spooler vulnerability, “PrintNightmare” (CVE-2021-34527) to run arbitrary code with system privileges. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors successfully exploited the vulnerability while targeting an NGO using Cisco’s Duo MFA, enabling access to cloud and email accounts for document exfiltration.

ESET researchers have uncovered yet another destructive data wiper that was used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine.

Dubbed CaddyWiper by ESET analysts, the malware was first detected at 11.38 a.m. local time (9.38 a.m. UTC) on Monday. The wiper, which destroys user data and partition information from attached drives, was spotted on several dozen systems in a limited number of organizations. It is detected by ESET products as Win32/KillDisk.NCX.

CaddyWiper bears no major code similarities to either HermeticWiper or IsaacWiper, the other two new data wipers that have struck organizations in Ukraine since February 23rd.

Much like with HermeticWiper, however, there’s evidence to suggest that the bad actors behind CaddyWiper infiltrated the target’s network before unleashing the wiper.

In early September 2021, Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed a financially motivated threat actor we refer to as EXOTIC LILY, exploiting a 0day in Microsoft MSHTML (CVE-2021-40444). Investigating this group’s activity, we determined they are an Initial Access Broker (IAB) who appear to be working with the Russian cyber crime gang known as FIN12 (Mandiant, FireEye) / WIZARD SPIDER (CrowdStrike).

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are aware of possible threats to U.S. and international satellite communication (SATCOM) networks. Successful intrusions into SATCOM networks could create risk in SATCOM network providers’ customer environments.

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